Abstract-Due to the unprecedented development of networks, manual network service provisioning is becoming increasingly risky, error-prone, expensive, and timeconsuming. To solve this problem, rule-based methods can provide adequate leverage for automating various network management tasks. This paper presents a rule-based solution for automated network service provisioning. The proposed approach captures configuration data interdependencies using high-level, service-specific, user-configurable rules. We focus on the service validation task, which is illustrated by means of a case study.
I. INTRODUCTION
As networks expand at an unprecedented rate, even minor changes in the network configuration can have serious consequences. For instance, incorrect link additions or upgrades can cause loss of connectivity, reduced performance, or security vulnerabilities across an entire network [1] . Anecdotal evidence in this regard includes the 1997 AS7007 and 2004 AS9121 incidents, in which large portions of the Internet (including tens of thousands of networks) became unreachable due to misconfigurations [2] . In a 2001 incident, all of Microsoft's websites went down for almost one day due to router misconfigurations in the DNS network [3] . Finding adequate solutions to this problem remains an open issue.
As manual trial-and-error solutions are becoming increasingly risky, error-prone, costly, and time-consuming, new automated configuration management tools and methods are required [1] . However, automation is not a universal remedy to complexity problems. Many topdown automated methods have failed to prove their efficiency and superiority over their manual alternatives, as they could not bridge the gap between high-level service c 2012 IEEE. correctness properties and low-level device configuration operations and parameters.
Various solutions imported from other domains (e.g., policy-based network management, Web services, model checking, relational databases, etc.) are faced with the state-space explosion problem when they are applied to networks, because of the constant growth and permanent change of the latter. To enforce the correctness of the networks while avoiding this problem, rule-based solutions divide the network configuration into regions, called configlets, corresponding to the services deployed over the network. The number of states in these service configurations can be further reduced by defining rules that restrict the values and structure of service configuration parameters.
We present a rule-driven network service provisioning solution based on high-level modelling of network configuration data and constraints. We analyse the rule properties and study the factors that influence them. Based on this analysis, we propose a method for improving rule efficiency and optimising rule-based network service provisioning tasks.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the related work. Section III presents the configuration information model on which our rule-based service provisioning approach is based. Section IV presents the main characteristics of a proposed Rule Specification Language. Section V presents a typical complex network service, which will be used in a case study. Section VI presents the validation rules and the networks used in the validation case study. Section VII presents and analyses the results of the case study. Section VIII explores possible optimisations of the validation task. Finally, the last section draws conclusions from this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
As traditional methods, mostly based on manual, trialand-error operation have failed to efficiently address the new challenges of network service provisioning, one of the emerging trends leverages rule-based techniques in order to provide automated operations and features.
According to the rules types and the assumed level of network-specific knowledge, there is a spectrum of rule-based service provisioning approaches. At one end of this spectrum, the service correctness properties 1 and 1 e.g., "Ensure that routing protocols do not allow forwarding loops." [3] . The Requirement Solver [20] uses the Alloy tool for specifying validation rules and the requirements of network and service configuration. However, the expressiveness of these rules and requirements is limited by the fact that Alloy is more adapted to software design than to network and service configuration. The NESTOR architecture [21] uses an OCL-based specification language to define network service provisioning rules. However, the expressiveness of these rules is limited by the fact that OCL was originally designed for defining constraints of UML diagrams. Text template-based solutions, such as the Crocodile router security checker [22] , capture text patterns directly from device configuration files using rules expressed in Backus-Naur form. However, the configlet templates used by these tools are vendor-specific and depend on the sequential order of the configuration commands. Other approaches use relational databases and SQL queries [3] , [6] , [23] , [24] , [25] . The downside of this approach is that converting the configurations into relational databases multiplies the number of variables and operations, which actually increases the complexity of management tasks.
Various approaches from the latter class (e.g., ValidMaker [26] , NCGuard [27] , OPNET's NetDoctor commercial tool) propose languages and configuration information models that are adapted to the nature of the networks and services. These models are generic with respect to the configuration languages, adequately capture the configuration mode hierarchy, and abstract the configuration data. Consequently, rules defined on these configuration information models are efficient and easy to implement.
It has been shown by [20] that when the service requirements are poorly captured by the validation rules, even tools that can solve millions of constraints in seconds are not fast enough. Therefore, to optimise the rulebased service provisioning process, it is important to study the properties (e.g., the efficiency and computational complexity) of the provisioning rules. To the best of our knowledge, despite its importance this issue has not been adequately covered in the literature. Narain [20] analysed the requirements written in Alloy for the Requirements Solver tool and formulated recommendations to improve their efficiency. However, this analysis is limited in scope and is supported by only a few quantitative results.
In [28] , we proposed a complexity model for the rulebased network service provisioning tasks and illustrated its use in a small service validation case study. In numerical examples, we determined the influence of the networklevel complexity factors and rule descriptive features on the rule execution complexity. In this paper, we assess the influence of these factors and features on rule efficiency and overall error coverage, with a case study that includes various network sizes and multiple services. We also provide further confirmation of the correlation found in [28] for different services and variable network-level complexity factors.
III. PROVISIONING RULES AND CONFIGURATION INFORMATION MODEL
This section starts with a presentation of the main concepts of our rule-based network service provisioning approach, and proceeds with the presentation of our configuration information model, called Meta-CLI. Finally, we present two extensions of the configuration information model, namely: a taxonomy of the configuration constraints enforced by the provisioning rules, and a configuration complexity model that quantifies the rulebased service provisioning tasks.
Service Correctness Rules -As networks constantly grow and undergo frequent changes, their complexity in terms of parameters, operations, and states tends to increase exponentially. Rule-based approaches drastically reduce this complexity by dividing the network configuration into regions (called configlets) corresponding to the services deployed over the network. Since these service configurations have fewer parameters and operations, their correctness is easier to enforce. The service configuration state-space can be further reduced by defining rules that enforce constraints on the values and structure of configuration parameters. An optimal network configuration decomposition and rule design should allow the enhancement of the efficiency while lowering the computational complexity of the rule-based service provisioning operations and tasks. This optimisation requires analysing the trade-offs and correlations between efficiency and complexity metrics for various factors, such as variable network complexity and multiple rule description features. Service correctness rules are defined on the data structures of an original, domain-specific information configuration model, which is presented next.
The Meta-CLI Model -As device configurations represent the actual database of the network management system [9] , it is important to abstract them while retaining full access to all their information. To do this, members of our team created the Meta-CLI Model [26] . As its name suggests, this meta-model abstracts configuration information from network devices and services and is generic with respect to various command-line interface (CLI) configuration languages, such as Cisco's IOS, Juniper's JUNOS, and Lucent's ComOS.
The Meta-CLI Model provides several types of XMLised tree-like data structures that abstract the hierarchy of the modes and sub-modes of the CLI information. The nodes of these trees abstract the commands and parameters from configurations. More precisely, device configurations are represented by Device models, while service configurations (or configlets) are represented by Service models. To enhance the reuse of the Service models, these are provided on two abstraction levels.
At the upper level, a network service configuration is represented by a Generic Service model, whose nodes retain only the generic properties of the configuration parameters, such as their names and number of occurrences in the service configuration. Also note that the nodes of the Generic Service models do not have values. At From node type 5 of the Generic Service model, 0 or N Service Instance model nodes can be derived. This twotier modelling hierarchy favours reuse, which consists in the creation of a unique Generic Service model and its replication, instantiation, and composition with different Device models. This allows easy deployment and removal of the service configuration data on, and from, the device configurations. In our example, an instance of network a service has been deployed on a device. In the Meta-CLI Model, this is done by composing their respective models. More exactly, the Service Instance model becomes a subtree of Device model tree, as shown in Fig. 1 .
Modelling the CLI hierarchy using tree-like data structures is complemented in the Meta-CLI Model by a set of rules that abstract the various dependencies and constraints which exist among configuration parameters. These generic constraint rules are user-configurable and defined in relation with nodes of the Generic Service tree models. A rule-based automation method for the service configuration tasks has been proposed by [29] .
Based on the Meta-CLI Model's data structures and rules, members of our team created the ValidMaker tool for automated provisioning of network services [26] . The subsequent sections of this article will present our rulebased approach and the ValidMaker tool in more detail.
To improve the design of the Meta-CLI Model, we also proposed a Configuration constraint taxonomy model [30] , which is described next. Several criteria are proposed by this model in order to classify the configuration constraints. At node level, the two main classes of configuration constraints are the structure constraints and the value constraints, which restrict the existence and contents, respectively, of Generic Service nodes. At subtree level, the two main classes of configuration constraints are the parallelism constraints, which put restrictions on the parallel existence and values of Generic Service nodes, and the inclusion constraints, which put restrictions on the existence of descendant nodes of Generic Service nodes. Based on their level of distribution, configuration constraints can also be classified into local constraints, which put restrictions on single devices, and global constraints, which put restrictions on pairs of devices. Based on this classification system we have defined a complexity model, which is presented next.
The Rule-Based Configuration Complexity Model [28] -proposes a hierarchical set of metrics to quantify the complexity of network service provisioning tasks. The defined metrics have four levels of granularity, which are described below.
At network level the rule set complexity can be evaluated in terms of the number and complexity of its elements, the validation rules. In addition, the number of instances of each rule gives a measure of the rule's instantiation complexity. A rule instance occurs when a rule is applied or executed on a Device model (local rule) or on a pair of Device models (global rule). For example, in Fig. 2 rule X is local since it is instantiated on a single device (Device 2). Rule Y is global since it is instantiated on a pair of devices (Device 1, Device 2).
At rule level the intrinsic complexity of a rule is expressed in terms of the number of constraint operations contained in its definition. For example, in "NodeNameExists" | "NodeDataExists" | "ConsistentIpAddress" | "ConsistentMask" | "ConsistentIsisNet" Tree Node ::= "1." Service Name "." Node Name | "2." Service Name "." Node Name Service Name ::= Char String Node Name ::= Char String C 4 ). Constraint operation O 1 materialises into an operation call on nodes (N 3 , N 4 ). Constraint operation O 2 materialises into an operation call on nodes (N 3 , N 6 ).
At node level a complexity indicator is the number of node visits. A node visit occurs whenever an operation call takes as argument a Device model node that matches the node type of the corresponding constraint operation.
IV. VALIDATION RULES
This section presents the syntax of the Rule Specification Language and the validation algorithm used by the ValidMaker tool. Table I shows the syntax in EBNF format.
Rule syntax starts with an Applicability Quantifier, which describes how often the subsequent If-Then rule structure should be applied to the selected Device nodes.
Applicability Quantifiers in the value rules can have three main values: Always, Multiple, and Once. Applicability Quantifiers in the structure rules can have two values: Correlated and Uncorrelated. The purpose of the Applicability Quantifier is to tweak the subsequent If-Then structure, as will be explained shortly. The Applicability Quantifier is followed by an If-Then structure whose action and condition are composed of Basic Operations concatenated by means of Boolean connectives such as And, Or, and Not. A Basic Operation can take one or two operands. The Former Operand is a mandatory Node Type. The Latter Operand is an optional Node Type or a string value (i.e., a constant). If the two operands belong to the same Device model, then they have the same index (i.e., 1). Otherwise, if the operands belong to different Device models, they have different indexes (i.e., 1 and 2). The Service Name is a character string that indicates the Generic Service on which the constraint operations have been defined. (A character string represents the name, a part of the name delimited by white-spaces, or the value of a command or parameter, e.g., command ip address 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.252 contains four character strings.) The Node name is a character string that indicates the selected node.
A. Validation Algorithm
This section presents the rule-based validation algorithm used by the ValidMaker tool. To better understand the validation procedure, we split it into two tiers.
Algorithm 1 Overall validation procedure
1: for all rules in ruleset do 2: instantiate(rule) on appropriate Device models 3: for all rule instances of current rule do 4: for all constraint operations in rule instance do 5: operation result←evaluate(constr operation) 6: end for 7: condition result←compose(operation results) 8: action result←compose(operation results) 9: if then result←evaluate(if cond. then action) 10: instance result←evaluate(rule instance) 11: end for 12: rule result← and(instance results) 13 : end for 14: validation result← and(rule results)
At the upper level we placed the Overall validation procedure, which is shown in Algorithm 1. According to this procedure, the service validation is performed using a set of rules. Each one of those rules is instantiated and run on a set of appropriate Device models. Each rule instance evaluation is done in several steps, namely: (1) evaluate each basic constraint operation; (2) evaluate the rule's condition and action parts by gluing together the constraint operation results using Boolean connectives; and (3) evaluate the If-Then structure of the rule based on its condition and action results combined with the value of the Applicability Quantifier. The overall validation result is obtained from the logical conjunction of the results of all the instances of all the rules.
The second-tier algorithms detail several operations of the validation process, such as: (1) the constraint operation evaluation; (2) rule instance evaluation; (3) value applicability evaluation; and (4) structure applicability evaluation.
Algorithm 2 Constraint operation evaluation
1: find nodes in Device models that match operand types 2: instantiate(constr operation) on nodes found 3: if type of(constraint operation) = structure then 4: for all operation calls in constraint operation do 5: operation call result←evaluate(operation call) 6: end for 7: operation result← or(operation call results) 8 : else {type of(constraint operation) = value} 9: operation result←evaluate(value applicability) 10: end if Algorithm 2 describes the evaluation procedure of a typical constraint operation. The ValidMaker tool searches for Device model nodes matching the operand types of the constraint operation and creates an operation call for each match. The result of each operation call of the current constraint operation is then evaluated. Based on the results of the operation calls, the result at the constraint operation level is then evaluated. In the case of structure constraint operations, the result is obtained by performing the logical disjunction of all the corresponding operation call results. In the case of value constraint operations, the result is evaluated using the Value applicability algorithm, which will be presented shortly (see Algorithm 4).
Algorithm 3 Rule instance evaluation
1: if type of(rule) = value then 2: rule instance result←evaluate(if cond. then action) 3: else 4: rule instance result←evaluate(structure applicability) 5 : end if Algorithm 3 presents the evaluation procedure of a rule instance. In the case of a value rule, the results of the corresponding rule instances are obtained by evaluating the If-Then structure. In the case of a structure rule, the results of the corresponding rule instances are evaluated using the Structure applicability algorithm, which will be presented shortly (see Algorithm 5) .
Algorithm 4 presents the evaluation procedure of the value applicability. A simple example will illustrate the difference between the three main value applicability quantifiers, Once, Multiple and Always. If the applicability quantifier in Fig. 2 for all operation calls in constraint operation do 3: operation call result←evaluate(operation call) 4: end for 5: constraint operation result← or(operation callresults) 6 : else if value applicability quantifier = Multiple then 7: for all operation call groups having a fixed former operand do 8: for all operation calls a having different latter operand do 9: operation call result←evaluate(operation call) 10: end for 11: per group result← or(operation call results) 12: end for 13: constraint operation result←and(per group results) 14 : else {value applicability quantifier = Always} 15: for all operation calls in constraint operation do 16: operation call results←evaluate(operation call) 17: end for 18: constraint operation result← and(operation callresults) 19 : end if
Operation Calls (C 1 through C 4 ) should return true. Else, if the applicability quantifier had the value Multiple, then Operation Calls (C 1 or C 2 ) and (C 3 or C 4 ) should return true. Finally, if the applicability quantifier had the value Once, then (at least) one operation call among C 1 through C 4 should return true. Note that the Multiple applicability quantifier plays a very important role. It is used when multiple instances of a service are present, e.g., for the fully-meshed iBGP peers, which will be presented in the next section.
Algorithm 5 Structure applicability evaluation
1: for all constraint operations in rule do 2: for all operands in constraint operation do 3: count(matching nodes) 4: end for 5: if (structure applicability quantifier = Correlated) and (∃(i, j|j = i) : counter i = counter j ) then 6: structure applicability result ← false 7: else {structure applicability quantifier = Uncorrelated} 8: structure applicability result ← true 9: end if 10: end for Algorithm 5 presents the evaluation procedure of the structure applicability. The result of the structure applicability evaluation depends on the value of the applicability quantifier. If that value is Correlated and the number of various operand-matching nodes is equal, then the structure applicability is evaluated to true. Otherwise, the result is false.
V. BGP/MPLS VPN SERVICE CONFIGURATION Our method is illustrated in a case study of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) [31] , [32] validation. Our choice for this type of service is done for the following reasons: (1) VPN is a complex service that may use (in some implementations) other services such as the Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [33] , (2) the fully-meshed peering feature of the Internal BGP requires multiple neighbor commands, which sharply increases the complexity of the configurations in large networks, (3) it is distributed over multiple devices, thereby allowing us to experiment with different sizes of networks, (4) as multiple VPN instances per network are supported, we can vary the number of VPNs during the experiments, and (5) it illustrates various types of configuration constraints.
Service Overview -A Virtual Private Network (VPN) service is a private network composed of several sites distributed geographically and interconnected by a public network called a backbone. A backbone network is owned and operated by one or more Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Within a VPN, any site can send IP packets securely and privately to the other sites. MPLS provides tunnelling, isolation, and security across the backbone for the various VPNs that share it. In this case, BGP is used inside the provider's network (Internal BGP or iBGP) in order to provide loop-free advertising of VPN route prefixes among routers found on the network's edge (called Provider Edge or PE routers). The simplest way for PEs to communicate is to advertise each other as BGP neigbors in a full-mesh fashion. Note also that an IGP protocol, such as IS-IS, is required in the backbone to provide the generic, non-VPN routing. Fig. 3 shows a BGP/MPLS VPN network topology that contains two VPNs deployed over three PE routers and one provider core (P) router. Fig. 4 shows the BGP/MPLS VPN commands configured on router PE 1. BGP/MPLS VPN commands configured on routers PE 2 and PE 3 have similar structures but may have some different values. However, some parameter values differ in the ip vrf, interface, router bgp and address family sections. The configuration file of the Core router P 1 is skipped because it does not have BGP and VPN sections.
In this paragraph, we briefly present several VPN, MPLS and BGP configuration commands.
• Command ip vrf creates VPN routing and forwarding (VRF) instances. Command rd defines the route distinguishers, which uniquely identify the customers' routes. The next command defines the route targets, which are used by the ingress routers to inform the egress routers about the customer the updates belong to. VRFs are activated on the appropriate interfaces by the command ip vrf forwarding.
• MPLS is enabled on the device by command ip cef and activated on sub-interfaces by command tag switching ip. • Command router bgp creates an iBGP session. Subsequent commands in the BGP section define the iBGP neighbors as well as the IPv4 and VPNv4 address families. For more details on the BGP/MPLS VPN-related commands, please refer to [32] .
VI. TESTBENCH SETUP
In this section, we present a selection of typical validation rules, describe the set of networks that compose the testbench and explain the conducted experiments.
The Validation Rules -We selected ten representative rules from the validation rule set to illustrate diverse rule types, distribution levels, applicability quantifiers, and scopes (for convenience, these will be henceforth called the descriptive rule features). Table II shows the ID, type, applicability, distribution level, and purpose of each selected rule. Notice that, in order distinguish between the local and global rule distribution levels, we prefixed the rule IDs with the letters X and Y , respectively. To indicate the Generic Service models on which same-group rules were defined, we suffixed, when necessary, the rule IDs with the letters P E or P . A rule group is composed of several rules that capture similar constraints on different types of Service Instances.
If we compare two rules such as X01B-PE and Y08A, we would see that they have quite different descriptive rule features. On one hand, rule X01B-PE applies locally on PE routers' Device models. It checks the parallel existence of the nodes that represent tag-switching, router isis and encapsulation commands. As the rule's applicability quantifier has the value Uncorrelated, there is no restriction on the number of these nodes. On the other hand, rule Y08A applies globally on each pair of Device models. It checks the existence of a single occurrence of equality between the IP addresses of a neighbor activate node and a Loopback0 interface node. The next section analyses the influence of various descriptive rule features on the efficiency 1  2  1  114  295  2  2  2  138  359  3  2  3  162  423  4  3  1  176  472  5  3  2  212  568  6  3  3  248  664  7  4  1  246  679  8  4  2  294  807  9  4  3  342  935 of the selected rules for variable numbers of devices, service instances, and duplicated commands (henceforth, these will be called the network-level complexity factors). We describe below the testbench used to illustrate the various factors and degrees of network-level complexity. The Testbench Networks -We populated our testbench with nine sample networks that have varying numbers of devices and service instances. Table III shows the number of PE routers and VPN services as well as the number of commands and character strings configured in the devices of the nine sample networks. For the sake of simplicity, all the networks have a single Core router (P), and all the PE routers have the same number of VPNs. Fig. 3 depicts Network 5, mentioned in Table III . We see that PE 1 has two VPNs (Customer 1 and Customer 2) and two iBGP neighbors (PE 2 and PE 3).
The Validation Procedure -consisted of executing N automated validation cycles. A validation cycle performs the following steps, some of which are similar to those performed in mutation testing [34] ): (i) randomly generate an error in the service-related commands of a configuration file; an error consists in altering or removing a command name or parameter name (e.g., neighbor → xyz or neighbor → ∅), a character string in those names (e.g., ip address → xyz address or address) or a parameter's value (e.g. 10.10.10.1 → 255.12.4.2 or ∅; note that the altered values complied with the legal value format and range), (ii) parse the network device configuration files, build corresponding Device models, discover the Service Instances deployed on those Device models, (iii) validate the services deployed over the network (using the algorithm shown on page 5), and (iv) record the rules that detected errors, add the numbers of hits and execution times per rule and overall, per service validation.
Upon completion of N cycles, we obtained the global number of detected errors as well as the number of hits per rule and overall. By dividing the global values by the number of cycles N , we obtained the corresponding average values per cycle. More exactly, we obtained the overall results (error coverage, average number of hits/cycle) and rule-level results (rule efficiency; i.e., average number of hits/cycle). We also calculated statically (by analysing valid configurations) the number of node visits/cycle. The next section presents and analyses these results.
VII. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section presents and analyses the validation results obtained at the individual rule level and at the overall level for the nine sample networks of our testbench. One basic metric that we used at both levels was the average number of hits/cycle. The number of hits/cycle per rule or overall represents the number of times the rule, or the set of rules in the validation rule set, detected a configuration error during a validation cycle. We set N = 5000 cycles and ran the Validation Procedure algorithm (presented in the previous section) five times. On each run we used different seeds for the pseudo-random function that generates the error location in the configuration file. Then we calculated the average values over the five runs for our metrics. The experiments were conducted on an Intel Pentium M computer running on Windows XP having 1.6 GHz and 512 MB of RAM.
A. Overall Results
At the service validation level, in addition to the above-mentioned metrics, we also measured the overall error detection rate, or error coverage, which represents the percentage of detected errors/cycle by the entire validation rule set. We also measured the number of undetected errors/cycle, which is the complement of the error coverage. Figs. 5(a) and 5(b) show the percentage of overall undetected errors/cycle and the overall number of error hits/cycle, respectively, for various numbers of PE routers and VPN services. Each network from Table III is represented by a point with x, y co-ordinates situated in the plane z = 0. These results are analysed in the following paragraphs.
The error coverage -Based on the results shown in Fig. 5(a) , we can highlight the following aspects: (a) the set of validation rules that we used models most of the configuration constraints and has a high error coverage (in our case study, only between 1.72-2.5 % of errors remained undetected); and (b) the error coverage scales well with the network-level complexity factors. We can capitalize on the increasing number of configuration constraints by modelling them with adequate rules and by choosing the right combination of rules. Thus, the validation rule set that we use will maintain its high error coverage when the network-level complexity increases.
The error coverage issues -can be grouped into the following classes. (i) Rule syntax issues: on one hand, some rule syntax features (e.g., constraint operations, applicability quantifiers, etc.) can be missing or insufficient.
On the other hand, some rule syntax features can be inefficient or inadequate. (ii) Rule design issues: on one hand, the set of rules may not cover all errors. On the other hand, some rules or rule subsets may "overlap" totally or partially; i.e., the intersection of their detected error sets is non-empty. (iii) Configuration constraint issues: on one hand, certain types of changes introduced into the configuration files do not always affect service consistency. On the other hand, some changes may cause inconsistencies in subnets that are found outside the validation domain (in our case, the provider backbone).
The average number of hits/cycle -varies in the range 1.61-2.17 % and increases with the size and complexity of the service configuration (as shown in Fig.  5[b] ). This confirms the assertions made at point (ii) of the error coverage analysis.
This indicator is correlated with the rule "overlapping" issue mentioned in the previous paragraph. Rule "overlapping" occurs in the following cases: (1) a command or parameter is subject to more than one configuration constraint. In this case, an error affecting that command or parameter will typically trigger all the rules that check these constraints; (2) if the structure of a subtree is corrupted, then some value constraints on its nodes may be infringed upon; and (3) due to bad design at the rule set level, some rules or rule subsets may "overlap".
B. Rule-Level Results
Rule efficiency (the number of hits/cycle) depends on network-level complexity factors (the number of rulecompatible devices, the number of service instances and the commands' multiplicity) and on descriptive rule features (rule's type, distribution level, applicability quantifier, and scope). When network-level complexity increases, the efficiency of global value rules that apply Always on multiple nodes of all the Device model types typically scales better than the efficiency of local structure rules that apply Once on unique nodes of a single Device model type.
For instance, Fig. 6 shows the efficiency (average number of hits/cycle) of selected rules from Table II for variable numbers of PE routers and deployed VPNs. We see that the efficiency of rules Y01H, X02B, and Y08A scales well, while the efficiency of rules X01B-PE, X06B-PE, X06E-P, X08D-PE, and Y03A is affected by the increase of the two network-level complexity factors. If we compare the profiles of the two classes of rules, we find the following differences. One one hand, a typical rule that does not scale well, such as X01B-PE, is a local structure rule, it has a narrower scope, and applies to unique nodes. One the other hand, a typical rule that scales well, such as Y01H, is a global value rule, has a wider scope, and applies Multiple times to groups of similar nodes.
Means to increase rule efficiency -Based on the previous analysis, we can optimise the validation process by redesigning the rules so as to increase their scalability with respect to the network-level complexity factors. This can be done by fine-tuning the descriptive rule features using the following operations: (i) replacing structure rules with value ones; (ii) replacing local rules with global ones; (iii) replacing more permissive applicability quantifiers with stricter ones; and (iv) widening the rule scope. Note that these actions can also increase rule execution complexity [28] . Consequently, when optimising the validation process, we need to find the right trade-off between rule's efficiency and execution complexity.
C. Correlation Between Efficiency and Complexity Measures
In [28] , we studied the correlation between rule efficiency and complexity. We expressed it using a simple equation:
where variable Hits represents the rule efficiency (average number of hits/cycle) determined dynamically (by validating inconsistent configurations), and variable Visits represents rule execution complexity, expressed as the number of node visits/cycle, determined statically (by analysing valid configurations). This equation shows that, for low error rates, rule efficiency can be estimated based on specific complexity metrics. We determined the coefficient constants a = 13.5 * 10 −3 and b = 722.3 * 10
by experimenting with variable descriptive rule features in a network in which an iBGP service was using Route Reflectors.
In this paper, we want to validate this formula using more complex networks, different types of services, and different network-level complexity factors. To this end, we selected a subset of representative rules from Table  II (X01B-PE, X02B, Y01H and Y08A) , which present a rich palette of descriptive rule features. As a step toward that goal, we first give a usage example of a typical rule execution complexity metric, the node visits. Next, we will use this metric to evaluate the execution complexity of various rule instances. For convenience, we chose the case when rule instances execute without encountering errors. Note that this choice is correct because the execution complexity is fully determined by the configuration. Finally, we will correlate the complexity metrics with the efficiency metrics of the set of selected rules, as shown in Fig. 6 . For example, in order to calculate the number of node visits required by the execution of rule instance Y01H(PE 1, PE 2), we take into account that this rule checks whether, for each route-target import command on router PE 1, there is a route-target export command on router PE 2 having the same value.
Figs. 4 and 3 show that Y01H(PE 1, PE 2) applies to two route-target import commands on router PE 1 and two route-target export commands on router PE 2, respectively. Since each command has one parameter, the successful execution of rule instance Y01H(PE 1, PE 2) requires five node visits. In order to calculate the number of instances of rule Y01H, we notice that it applies to non-commutative pairs of PE router Device models. Since Network 5 contains 3 PE routers, there will be 6 Y01H rule instances, whose execution requires 5 * 6 = 30 node visits. In order to calculate the number of node visits of rule Y01H in the other networks, we take into account the fact that the number of route-target commands is correlated with the number of VPNs, and that the number of rule instances is correlated with the number of PEs. For more details on the algorithm used to count the node visits and other complexity metrics, please refer to [28] . Fig. 7 shows the number of node visits/cycle performed during the execution of rules X01B-PE, X02B, Y01H and Y08A. Based on the number of node visits and the rule efficiency metrics shown in Fig. 6 , we can assess the validity of formula (1) for networks and services with various degrees of complexity. Fig. 8 shows the efficiency (average number of hits/cycle, determined dynamically) vs the execution complexity (number of node visits/cycle, determined statically) for rules X01B-PE, X02B, Y01H and Y08A.
We determined coefficients a and b by fitting the data VIII. RULE OPTIMISATION The optimisation process requires an analysis of the efficiency and execution complexity results per individual rule and per entire rule set. To enhance the efficiency and lower the complexity of the validation process, the following rule optimisation steps are recommended (see Algorithm 6).
Algorithm 6
Rule optimisation procedure 1: create initial rule set; 2: repeat 3: validate service using repeatable experiments; 4: analyse results; 5: if rule syntax feature missing then 6: add feature; 7: else if rule syntax incorrect or inefficient then 8: debug code; 9: else if rule missing then 10: add rule; 11: else if rule design incorrect/inefficient then 12: improve rule; 13: else if rules [rule subsets] totally "overlap" then 14: remove redundant rules [rule subsets]; 15: else if rules [rule subsets] partially "overlap" then 16: redesign rules [subsets] to reduce "overlapping"; 17: end if 18: replace complex/inefficient rules with simple/efficient ones; 19: until error coverage and validation complexity values meet desired targets Note that, in order to choose the position of the corrupted character string within the configuration file, we used a pseudo-random generation function and a controlled seed. This rule optimisation algorithm tackles the first two types of error coverage issues mentioned in Section VII-A, namely those relative to the rules' syntax and design. It does not tackle the third type of error coverage issues, which are related to the configuration constraints (errors that do not affect service consistency and errors that infringe upon constraints that extend beyond our validation domain). We applied this algorithm to Network 6 of the testbench using a fixed seed until we removed all the errors caused by bad rule syntax and design. The remaining undetected errors (representing 1.5%) were caused by the following issues: (i) randomly changing Frame Relay label values did not affect the existing Frame Relay validation rules unless collisions occurred between label values of the same router (which rarely happened); (ii) the IP addresses of interfaces connected to the customers were not checked, as these connections extend beyonded our validation domain; We then reused the same set of rules to validate all the networks of our testbench using five different seeds per network. We obtained error miss rates that vary between 1.62% and 2.5%.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a rule-based network service provisioning approach. This approach enforces the correctness of network services using a set of validation rules. These high-level, service-specific, userconfigurable, machine-executable rules model the constraints on the parameter values and the structure of device configurations. We illustrated our approach in a service validation case study involving several networks of variable sizes and variable numbers of deployed services. Based on the presented results, we analysed the influence of network-level complexity factors and descriptive rule features on rule efficiency. Our analysis shows the operators how to increase rule efficiency by redesigning the validation rules. We also presented a technique that allows operators to improve error coverage. We have shown that a high error coverage can be achieved as the complexity of networks and services increases. We reassessed the correlation function between specific rule efficiency and rule complexity metrics found in previous work. We have shown that this correlation function holds for various types and degrees of complexity of networks and services.
